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Abstract
Mandates, like the renewable fuel standard (RFS), for biofuels from corn and cellulosic feedstocks,
impact the environment in multiple ways by affecting land use, nitrogen (N)-leakage, and
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. We analyze the differing trade-offs these different types of
biofuels offer among these multi-dimensional environmental effects and convert them to a
monetized value of environmental damages (or benefits) that can be compared with the economic
costs of extending these mandates over the 2016–2030 period. The discounted values of cumulative
net benefits (or costs) are then compared to those with a counterfactual level of biofuels that would
have been produced in the absence of the RFS over this period. We find that maintaining the corn
ethanol mandate at 56 billion l till 2030 will lead to a discounted cumulative value of an economic
cost of $199 billion over the 2016–2030 period compared to the counterfactual scenario; this
includes $109 billion of economic costs and $85 billion of net monetized environmental damages.
The additional implementation of a cellulosic biofuel mandate for 60 billion l by 2030 will increase
this economic cost by $69 billion which will be partly offset by the net discounted monetized value
of environmental benefits of $20 billion, resulting in a net cost of $49 billion over the 2016–2030
period. We explore the sensitivity of these net (economic and environmental) costs to alternative
values of the social costs of carbon and nitrogen and other technological and market parameters.
We find that, unlike corn ethanol, cellulosic biofuels can result in positive net benefits if the
monetary benefits of GHG mitigation are valued high and those of N-damages are not very high.
The renewable fuel standard (RFS) was established
by the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007 with the motive of enhancing energy security,
reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and pro-
moting rural economic development in the United
States (U.S.). The RFS mandated blending of 136 bil-
lion l of first-generation biofuels (from food crops)
and second generation (cellulosic) biofuels with fossil
fuels by 2022. While the corn ethanol mandate
has been met and its production has grown to
57 billion l, the production of cellulosic biofuels has
been negligible so far (Debnath et al 2019)5. Although
5 The commercialization of cellulosic biofuel remains negligible
due to technological challenges in converting biomass to reactive
the volumetric targets of various types of biofuels
beyond 2022 are yet to be determined, a forward-
looking analysis of the potential economic and envir-
onmental implications of extending the corn ethanol
mandate and adding the cellulosic biofuel man-
date to be achieved by 2030 can inform policy
discussions.
intermediates, termed recalcitrance, and to biofuel efficiently at
commercial scale, leading to relatively high production costs com-
pared to oil prices (Lynd 2017, Debnath et al 2019). However, as
recent studies indicate, more advanced bioengineering techniques
are being developed to increase the conversion efficiency and lower
the production cost of cellulosic biofuel (Jung and Altpeter 2016,
Kumar et al 2018, Baral et al 2019, Liu et al 2019).
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 034021 L Chen et al
Biofuel production and their feedstocks can gen-
erate multiple environmental impacts; they not only
affect GHG emissions by displacing fossil fuels but
they also affect nitrogen applications and GHG emis-
sions due to the direct and indirect land use change
caused by the increased demand for biofuel feed-
stocks (see review in Donner and Kucharik 2008,
Khanna and Crago 2012, Sun et al 2020). This can
impact leakage of reactive nitrogen (N) inputs to the
environment and affect air, water (surface freshwa-
ter, groundwater, coastal) and climate systems. These
positive and negative environmental effects of bio-
fuels differ with the feedstock used. Different types
of biofuels feedstocks also differ in the economic
costs and benefits they will impose on food and fuel
consumers and producers depending on their cost
of production and competition for cropland. Given
these multi-directional environmental and economic
impacts of biofuel production, a social cost–benefit
approach that monetizes the value of these multiple
environmental effects will enable a comparison of
the value of the environmental impacts with the eco-
nomic costs of biofuel mandates and an assessment
of the net societal benefits6 of extending biofuel man-
dates until 2030.
A key objective of this paper is to examine the eco-
nomic and environmental consequences of extend-
ing corn ethanol and cellulosic ethanol mandates
over the 2016–2030 period and to analyze the trade-
offs among these multi-dimensional effects using the
social cost–benefit approach. This framework allows
us to determine the net economic benefit maximiz-
ing approach to achieving a biofuelmandate. By com-
paring net economic benefits with and without the
mandate, we assess the net economic benefit or cost
of the mandate for the U.S. as well as quantify the
distributional effects of these biofuel policies on food
and fuel consumers and producers. Since these mon-
etary benefits and costs are occurring over time, and
money has a time value7, we discount future net bene-
fits of these mandates to obtain their present value
in 2016 and compare it with the present value of net
benefits under a No-Policy scenario. We define the
No-Policy scenario as the level of biofuels (24.6 bil-
lion l of corn ethanol and 3.52 billion l of biodiesel)
that would have been produced in the absence of the
RFS being established in 2007 (‘No-Policy scenario’).
To isolate the effects of the corn ethanol mandate
6Agricultural/fuel consumer benefit is measured by the difference
between the maximum consumers are willing to pay for various
agricultural/fuel commodities (as given by the demand curves for
those commodities) and the price of those commodities. The pro-
ducer benefit is measured by the profit from producing agricultur-
al/fuel commodities.
7Time value of money arises because money we have now is worth
more than an identical sum in the future provided money can earn
interest. As a result, a comparison of the monetary value of a dollar
now and a dollar in the future can only be done after discounting
the future dollar and obtaining its present discounted value.
from cellulosic ethanol mandate, we compare the
effects of two alternative scenarios; a ‘Corn Ethanol
Mandate scenario’, in which the corn ethanol pro-
duction remains at the cap of 56 billion l under the
RFS and a ‘Corn+ Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate scen-
ario’ in which additional cellulosic ethanol produc-
tion ramps up to 60 billion l of cellulosic ethanol
by 2030. In both these scenarios, biodiesel produc-
tion increases to 6.03 billion l. We then quantify the
effects of these mandates on land use, changes in
GHG emissions, and N-leakage over the 2016–2030
time-period.
We undertake this analysis by extending the
Biofuel and Environmental Policy Analysis Model
(BEPAM). BEPAM is a multi-period, open-economy,
multi-market partial equilibrium, optimization
model that integrates the agricultural and transport-
ation sectors of the U.S. economy and incorporates
trade with the rest of the world (ROW). We apply
it to determine the maximum discounted value of
the net economic benefits to consumers and pro-
ducers in the agricultural and transportation sec-
tors over the 2016–2030 period in each of the three
scenarios. By comparing these net economic bene-
fits across scenarios, we assess the net economic cost
(or benefit) of the biofuel mandate. We quantify the
GHG emissions and N-leakage across these scenarios
and monetize the change in the value of these envir-
onmental impacts using the concepts of social cost of
carbon (Interagency Working Group 2013, Khanna
et al 2017) and the social cost of nitrogen (Sobota
et al 2015, Keeler et al 2016) to determine the net
social costs or benefits of the mandates. We consider
N-leakage effects caused by the conversion of N to
N2O, NOx, NH3, and NO3 and from N loadings to
surface water, groundwater and coastal systems and
analyze the trade-offs that the biofuel mandate offers
between GHG emissions and N emissions. We exam-
ine the effects of various technological, parametric
and market conditions on the net societal benefits of
these biofuel mandates.
1. Previous literature
There is a large literature analyzing the economic
and environmental effects of biofuels (see reviews in
Debnath et al 2019, Khanna et al Forthcoming). Pre-
vious studies have focused on examining one envir-
onmental impact of biofuels at a time and do not
consider the multiple environmental effects of bio-
fuels. They also do not combine them with the eco-
nomic impacts of biofuel mandates to examine the
synergies and trade-offs among them. Many stud-
ies have examined the direct life-cycle GHG intensity
of biofuels and the market-mediated effects induced
by biofuels on food and fuel prices in the world
market. These market-mediated effects were shown
to lead to indirect land use change (ILUC) in the
2
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agricultural sector and to fuel rebound effects in the
transportation sector8.
Research examining the ILUC-related emissions
intensity of biofuels has largely focused on corn
ethanol; there has been limited analysis of the
ILUC effects of energy crops produced for cellulosic
biofuels9. Taheripour and Tyner (2013) examine the
land use effects of producing specific levels of mis-
canthus and switchgrass ethanol and assume that the
amount of land needed per-unit ethanol is uniform
across geographic regions and linearly related to the
volume of biofuels. In contrast to these papers that
examined the ILUC effect of a given volume of a spe-
cific type of biofuel and do not consider the land
use interactions when several types of biofuels will be
produced simultaneously, our paper examines these
ILUC effects for the endogenously determined mix of
cellulosic biofuels from various feedstocks and incor-
porates the heterogeneity in the yields of these crops
across the rainfed region in the U.S. It also uses more
updated land use change estimates to obtain forward-
looking estimates of the ILUC-relatedGHGemissions
using a 2016 land use baseline.
Previous analyses of the fuel rebound effect of
biofuels were undertaken when the U.S. was a major
importer of oil and gasoline and a large decrease in
its consumption level could be expected to lower the
world oil price and lead to a positive rebound effect
(such that a liter of biofuel would displace less than a
liter of gasoline). A number of early studies showed
that this rebound effect in the global fuel market
due to biofuel production in the U.S. could be large
(Degorter and Drabik 2011, Thompson et al 2011,
Chen and Khanna 2012, Chen et al 2014, Bento et al
2015, Rajagopal et al 2015, Hudiburg et al 2016).
Empirical evidence, however, suggests otherwise and
that the effect of biofuels on oil price has been small
(see review in Khanna et al Forthcoming).
With the increase in shale oil and gas production,
the U.S. has now transitioned into a smaller importer
of oil and a net exporter of petroleum products in
the world market (EIA 2017, 2020). Moreover, the lit-
erature indicates that the price elasticity of demand
8The ILUC effects in the agricultural sector could occur because
biofuels have the potential to raise food crop prices and lead to
expansion of cropland in the US and ROW (Searchinger et al
2008, Hertel et al 2010, Taheripour and Tyner 2013, Witcover et al
2013).The rebound effect in the oil market could occur if the large-
scale displacement of demand for petroleum products by biofuel
in the U.S. reduces demand for oil in the world market; this could
lower the world oil price, leading to a ‘rebound’ in oil consumption
in the ROW.
9 Several studies that have analyzed the potential of corn ethanol
(Farrell et al 2006, Chen and Khanna 2012, Rajagopal 2013) and
cellulosic ethanol (Tilman et al 2009, Gelfand et al 2013, Hudiburg
et al 2016, Daioglou et al 2017, Khanna et al 2017) to lower GHG
emissions and the extent to which the ILUC effect due to the large-
scale production of biofuels would offset the direct saving due to
biofuels displacing fossil fuels (see reviews in Khanna and Crago
2012, Khanna et al 2017).
for gasoline in the US is low and has been declining
(Hughes et al 2008, Greene 2012). As a result of both
supply and demand side factors, changes in biofuel
productions in the U.S. are likely to have a smaller
effect on the world oil price. However, blending high-
cost biofuels with gasoline in the U.S. can be expected
to raise fuel prices in the U.S. and lead to a negative
rebound effect, such that a liter of ethanol displaces
more than an energy equivalent liter of gasoline, as
found to be the case byRajagopal et al (2015).We ana-
lyze the extent to which this is the case and its implic-
ations on the GHG savings due to biofuels in the
transportation sector. The fuel market price impacts
affect not only the GHG mitigation achieved by bio-
fuels but also the welfare-economic effects of the RFS.
Earlier studies showed that the corn ethanol mandate
(Moschini et al 2010, Cui et al 2011) and the com-
bined corn and cellulosic ethanol mandates (Chen
et al 2014) increase the economic benefits because
they improve the terms of trade of the U.S. (by lower-
ing the price of fuel imports and raising the price of
US agricultural exports). However, the changes in the
U.S. fuel market discussed above may reduce these
beneficial terms-of-trade effects and increase the eco-
nomic costs of implementing the extended U.S. bio-
fuels mandate in the future.
Previous studies have examined the effects of
expanding corn production on N-fertilizer applic-
ation and its effect on water quality in the Mis-
sissippi River Basin (Secchi et al 2011, White et al
2014). Donner and Kucharik (2008) estimated that
meeting the corn ethanol mandate of 57 billion l
would result in a 10% increase in nitrogen reach-
ing the Gulf from the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River
Basin. More recently, Ferin et al (2021) showed that
the additional implementation of the cellulosic bio-
fuel mandate would worsen water quality even fur-
ther by incentivizing the harvesting of crop residues.
These studies do not consider damages in and outside
the Mississippi-Atchafalaya River Basin due to other
forms in which applied N can leak into the environ-
ment (as N2O, NOx, NH3, and NO3) and worsen air
quality, contaminate drinking water supply, degrade
water quality and negatively contribute to the global
climate system (Bennett et al 2001, Galloway et al
2004, Davidson et al 2012, Leach et al 2012).
In undertaking this analysis, we extend previous
applications of BEPAM to analyze the effects of bio-
fuel policies on the transportation and agricultural
sectors (Chen and Khanna 2012, Huang et al 2013,
Chen et al 2014, Hudiburg et al 2016, Khanna et al
2017) in several ways. First, unlike previous versions
of BEPAM that modeled gasoline and diesel mar-
kets as independent markets, we have now modeled
them as joint products (produced in fixed propor-
tions) from crude oil which is produced domestic-
ally and imported from the ROW. We assume the
U.S. can affect the price of oil in the world market
through its oil import decisions. This is based on the
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observation that the U.S. is still a fairly large importer
in the crude oil market (EIA 2017). However, we now
model the U.S. as a small, price-taking exporter of
petroleum products to the ROW (EIA 2017) instead
of a large importer of gasoline (with the ability to
lower world prices through biofuel-induced displace-
ment).We also assume a relatively elastic supply curve
for crude oil10 based on previous studies (Hughes
et al 2008, Hochman et al 2011, Greene 2012, Hoch-
man and Zilberman 2018)11. Second, we determine
the domestic direct land use change and ILUC, due
to the biofuel mandates, endogenously. As a result,
the domestic indirect land use related GHG emissions
intensity of biofuels is determined endogenously and
may vary over time rather than being a constant value
assumed in previous applications of BEPAM (such as
Khanna et al 2017).
2. Methods
BEPAM determines the optimal land use, produc-
tion and consumption decisions in the agricultural
and transportation sectors in the U.S. that maxim-
ize the sum of consumers’ and producers’ net bene-
fits in both the sectors subject to various material
balances, land and resource availability constraints,
and policy scenarios. It endogenously determines the
quantities of row crops, biomass feedstock, biofuels,
and fossil fuels and their prices that ensure that mar-
ket demand and supply are in equilibrium. It incor-
porates domestic agricultural and fuel markets in the
U.S. and trade in agricultural commodities and pet-
roleum products with the ROW.
Themodel considers spatial heterogeneity in crop
and livestock production, where costs of production,
yields, and land availability differ across crop report-
ing districts (CRDs). Crops can be produced using
alternative rotation, tillage, and irrigation practices.
The model simulates optimal land use allocation for
major row crops and energy crops on active crop-
land as well as land that is considered idle12 endogen-
ously based on the availability of land, the net returns
to crop production, endogenously determined crop
prices, historical land mix constraints, policy, and
10Domestic price elasticity of oil supply is assumed to be 2, ROW
oil price supply and demand elasticities are assumed to be 1 and−4
based on Thompson et al (2011). More details are documented in
section 1.3 of SI.
11 Studies that model upstream oil market estimate a smaller effect
relative to those that focus only on finished fuel markets (see the
review in Hochman and Zilberman 2018). These estimates could
be even smaller if the strategic behavior by the cartel of oil pro-
ducing nations (e.g. OPEC) is considered. For example, Hochman
et al (2011) argue the cartel would lower oil production in response
to increased biofuel production, mitigating the negative impact of
biofuel displacement on oil price.
12This is defined as cropland that likely earns close to zero net
returns fromcropproduction (Jiang et al 2020).More details on the
how active cropland and idle land available in 2016 were determ-
ined can be found in section 2.1 of SI.
technology constraints. The amount of land under
crop production and idle changes annually depending
on returns to the land13. By comparing the amount of
land under crop production in each year after 2016 in
the No-Policy scenario, we determine the amount of
land that could have been planted but was not planted
(and therefore idled) in each year.
The transportation sector in BEPAM consists
of downward sloping linear demand functions for
vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) with four differ-
ent types of vehicles: conventional gasoline, flex-fuel,
gasoline-hybrid, and diesel vehicles. We implicitly
derive the gasoline and diesel demand from the VKT
demand functions for road transportation by incor-
porating fuel efficiency assumptions for the vehicle
fleet14. We specify the domestic oil supply and the
demand and supply of oil in the ROW. The U.S. is
assumed to be an importer in the oil market, but a
small, price-taking exporter in the world market for
gasoline and diesel. Domestically produced oil and
imported oil are converted to gasoline and diesel in
a fixed proportion. Themodel endogenously determ-
ines the implicit cost of VKT depending on the mar-
ginal cost of oil, costs of conversion of oil to gasol-
ine and diesel, extent and mix of biofuels blended
and the operation and maintenance costs of vehicles
under the alternative biofuel policies. The transport-
ation sector only considers demand for on-road VKT
and does not include the aviation sector. More details
of the model can be found in the supplementary
information (sections 1 and 2) (available online at
stacks.iop.org/ERL/16/034021/mmedia).
To analyze the economic and environmental
effects that can be attributed to various biofuels, we
simulate the following three alternative scenarios over
the 2016–2030 period:
(a) No-Policy: corn ethanol and biodiesel produc-
tion are assumed to remain at their 2007 levels
of annual production of 24.6 billion l and
3.52 billion l each year.
(b) Corn Ethanol Mandate: annual corn ethanol
production is assumed to be at the maximum
permitted level of 56.78 billion l under the RFS
13 Landowners are assumed to use a 10 year rolling horizon tomake
land use decisions for the next 10 years (for example, investment in
establishment of perennial energy crops to meet future targets for
cellulosic ethanol) taking land availability, technology and policy as
given. From the resulting multi-year equilibrium solution, we take
the first-year’s solution as the ‘realized’ solution and used them to
update the land that is under crop production and idled and costs of
producing biofuels due to learning by doing.More technical details
of rolling horizon and multiple-year equilibrium solution can be
found in Chen et al (2014).
14The fuel efficiency projections are obtained fromAnnual Energy
Outlook (EIA 2017). We are assuming the demand for VKT with
alternative types of vehicles is determined exogenously and are
only considering the marginal fuel and operation and mainten-
ance related costs of VKT with different vehicles under alternative
biofuel policies.
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and annual biodiesel production is assumed to
be 6.03 billion l.
(c) Corn + Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate: Cellulosic
ethanol production is assumed to grow linearly
from 0.87 billion l in 2016 to 60.56 billion l in
2030 while annual corn ethanol and biodiesel
production levels are at levels in the Corn Eth-
anol Mandate scenario.
We implement the mandate in BEPAM by estab-
lishing annual blend rates to meet the volumetric
goals for ethanol and biodiesel; these blend rates
increase beyond the 11.5% level in 2016 to 24.2% by
2030 under the Corn + Cellulosic Biofuel Mandate
scenario. To determine the social welfare effects of the
two alternative biofuel policy scenarios, we assess the
impact of each of these policies on the food and fuel
prices and quantities in the agricultural and trans-
portation sectors and, thus, on the discounted value
of the sum of consumer and producer net benefits in
these sectors relative to the No-Policy scenario over
the 2016–2030 period. We assume a social discount
rate of 3% (for more discussion of the social discount
rate see Boardman et al 2017)15.
2.1. Social costs of GHG emissions estimation
We estimate the direct GHG emissions intensity of
the various types of biofuels and the GHG emis-
sions mitigated by displacing fossil fuels. The above-
groundGHG emissions related to agricultural activit-
ies, including planting, maintenance and harvest are
estimated by multiplying various production inputs
with corresponding emission factors obtained from
the GREET model (see details in the SI in section 3).
We endogenously determine the U.S. domestic ILUC
related GHG emissions generated by the food crop
price effects caused by the production of biofuels to
meet different biofuels mandate. Emissions due to
the conversion of idle cropland in the U.S. in 2016
to crop production (conventional or energy crops)
in response to changes in market demand and crop
prices are obtained by multiplying the amount of idle
land converted with the emission-factors obtained
from Taheripour et al (2017). International ILUC
emissions due to the conversion of cropland to bio-
fuel feedstocks in the ROW are not accounted for in
this study (estimates of those are reviewed in Khanna
and Crago 2012, Taheripour et al 2017). We also
incorporate soil carbon sequestration by both row
and energy crop productions; the extent of this var-
ies by crops, land types, and production operations
(Hudiburg et al 2016, also see more details in section
3 of SI).
15There is no consensus in the literature on the appropriate dis-
count rate to use in a social cost benefit analysis. As a result, U.S.
EPA (2017) estimated social cost of carbon under various discount
rates (e.g. 2.5%, 3% and 5%).
We then estimate the social costs of GHG emis-
sions due to the implementation of the U.S. biofuel
policies by multiplying the total GHG emissions with
the social cost of carbon, which is a measure of the
discountedmonetary value of the global damages due
to carbon emissions. There is a wide disparity in the
range of estimates of the social cost of carbon but
a considerable consensus that $50 per metric ton of
CO2 equivalent (Mg−1 CO2-eq) is a reasonable estim-
ate with the same 3% social discount rate assumed
here (EPA 2017, Khanna et al 2017). We analyze the
sensitivity of our social costs and benefits of the RFS
by considering two alternative values, $50Mg−1 CO2-
eq and $100 Mg−1 CO2-eq.
2.2. N-damage cost estimation
We apply our modeling approach to assess the spa-
tially varying additions to N induced by the corn
ethanol and the cellulosic ethanol mandates over
the 2016–2030 period. The extent to which applied
N will leak into the environment and the form of
that leakage and the amounts that are transported to
end-points (drinking water wells, coastal zone, atmo-
sphere) where the environmental damages occur are
expected to vary spatially. We estimate the N-leakage
to the environment due to agricultural anthropogenic
nitrogen fertilizer use in each period by multiplying
the simulated total volumeofN applicationwith coef-
ficients obtained from Sobota et al (2015) that meas-
ure the transfer of synthetic N-fertilizer to land, air,
and water resources (see more details in section 4 of
SI and table S1).
In the absence of N-leakage cost data at a state-
specific level for all the states in the U.S., Sobota
et al (2015) complied the damage costs associated
with N applications based on information obtained
from existing studies (Compton et al 2011, vanGrins-
ven et al 2013) (see details in table 1 in Sobota et al
2015). We estimate the potential N-damages costs
($ kg−1 N) by the environmental resource affected
(air/climate, freshwater, drinking water, and coastal
zone)16. The total N-damage costs in each CRD
are then calculated by multiplying the total amount
of N-leaked to the environment with the per-unit
damage costs ($ kg−1 N) associated with the corres-
ponding air/climate, freshwater, drinking water, and
coastal zone related damages. Assuming these dam-
age costs increase linearly with an additional unit of
16Damages due to N2O arise due to increased ultra-violet light
exposure from ozone to humans and to crops and increased emis-
sions of GHGs. Damages to surface water from N loadings include
those due to declining property value, loss of recreational use
and loss of endangered species. N-damages to surface-water and
ground-water to drinking water include those due to increased
eutrophication, undesirable odor and taste, nitrate contamination
and increased colon cancer risk while those to coastal ecosystems
stem from loss of recreational use and decline in fisheries and estu-
arine/marine habitat.
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nitrogen leaked, we sum across these types of nitro-
gen damage costs to estimate the total N-damages
for each CRD and the contiguous U.S. These damage
costs range from a low value of $5.45 kg−1 N applied,
a medium value of $10.17 kg−1 N applied and a high
value of $16.87 kg−1Napplied17.We analyze the sens-
itivity of the overall social welfare to a range of values
of the social cost ofN estimated by Sobota et al (2015).
Our analysis here relies on simplifying assumptions
that social cost of N-damage is spatially homogen-
ous. However, this estimate, as Sobota et al (2015)
noted, is compiled from large-scale studies (national
or regional); as a result it is reasonable to consider it to
be representative of values over the large geographical
scale studied here.
3. Results
We validate BEPAM by comparing simulated out-
comes in the fuel and agricultural sectors over the
2016–2019 period with observed data. We find the
land allocation to the major U.S. crops (corn, soy-
bean, and wheat) deviates by less than 10% from
observed data (table S2(a) in SI). Average national
food crop prices are generally within 10% of the
observed values except for the corn price, which
is 11% higher than the actual prices observed in
2016–2018 (panel B in table S2(a) in SI)18. Fuel con-
sumption also generally deviate by less than 10% from
observed values (table S2(b) in SI). The deviations
of the simulated outcomes of the updated BEPAM
for 2016–2019 from their observed values over the
2016–2019 period are generally within a similar level
of tolerance as in previous studies applying BEPAM
(Chen et al 2014, Hudiburg et al 2016).
3.1. Land use in the No-Policy scenario
The land requirements for conventional crops and
biofuel feedstocks and their quantities produced and
prices under the various scenarios are presented in
table 1. Under the No-Policy scenario, we find that
109 million ha (M ha) land will be used for row crop
production in 2030 and there will be 15 M ha of idle
cropland (table 1). Of this 11 M ha land is idle land
in 2016, while the remaining 4 M ha is cropland that
used to be under crop production in 2016 but would
become idle by 2030 in the No-Policy scenario (figure
17The medium value estimated here is similar to the social cost of
$10.79 kg−1 N from fertilizer application in Minnesota by Keeler
et al (2016). The medium values of N-damage costs related to
nitrate estimated here is also close to the social value of $8.7 kg−1
N for nitrate reduction in the Corn Belt region by Ribaudo et al
(2005). All values are in 2016 dollars.
18We apply the validatedmodel to simulate outcomes for 2030 and
compare outcomes with the No-Policy scenario. In undertaking
this comparison, we are keeping all parameters andmodel assump-
tions exactly the same in the No-Policy and alternative policy scen-
arios. We, therefore, expect that the model validation error is the
same across the scenarios and washes out when we take a differ-
ence across scenarios to evaluate the impact of a policy scenario.
S1(a)). The time-varying amount of idle cropland is
driven by two assumptions in the model: an exogen-
ous growth in yields of row crops (around 1% yr−1
for corn, soybean and wheat) and an outward shift
in domestic demand and export demand overtime
at exogenously specified rates19. Consistent with his-
torical trends in land under crop production in the
U.S., we find that the increasing trend in productivity
growth will outpace growth in the demand for agri-
cultural production in the U.S.; therefore, the total
land used for crop production will decrease by 3.5%
by 2030 compared to that in 2016, inducing a net
increase of 4 M ha in idle cropland by 2030.
3.2. Effect of the biofuel mandate on agricultural
sector
Under the Corn Ethanol Mandate, the demand
for corn production will increase by 21%, which
will increase land under corn production by 23%
(as shown in column 2, table 1); this increase is
achieved, in part, by reducing land under soybeans
and wheat and in part by increasing land under
crop production. The increase in demand for corn
will lead to an increase in land under continuous
corn and under corn–soybean rotation while redu-
cing land under wheat and continuous soybeans.
Overall, land under wheat and soybeans declines by
1.6% and 0.4%, respectively, relative to the No-Policy
scenario. Higher corn demand will increase its price
by 12%. The price of soybeans increases by 7% as land
under soybeans declinesmarginally while the produc-
tion of biodiesel increases the demand for soybeans.
Despite the reduction in land under wheat, wheat
production increases as its production shifts to pro-
ductive land released from soybeans and its yield per-
unit land increases. As a result, the price of wheat
decreases slightly by 1.2% relative to the No-Policy
scenario (table 1). Overall, the increased demand for
corn ethanol will increase land under crop produc-
tion by 5.9 M ha (5.4%) in 2030 relative to that in the
No-Policy scenario, including 1.9 M ha (1.7%) from
land that was idle in 2016 and 4 M ha (3.7%) from
land that would otherwise have been idled in 2030
under the No-Policy scenario (figure S1(b)).
We estimate the GHG emissions due to this indir-
ect land use change of 1.9 M ha that can be attrib-
uted to corn ethanol and biodiesel mandates by con-
verting the total changes in idle land to a per-liter
estimate using the approach in Chen and Khanna
(2018)20. We find that the idle land in 2016 converted
19The increase in the national average crop yields resulted in
a slight decrease in commodity prices for crops over the study
period and lower expected returns for cropland, inducing cropland
with relatively low productivity to exit from crop production and
become idle. This is offset to some extent by the outward shift in
demand which increases the expected returns to cropland.
20We estimate the static impact of a biofuel production shock by
calculating the change in the idle land in 2016 per unit of the
increase in corn ethanol and biodiesel production in 2030.
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Table 1. Effects of alternative biofuels mandate on the agricultural sector in 2030.
Corn+ Cellulosic Corn+ Cellulosic
Corn Ethanol Ethanol Corn Ethanol Ethanol
Scenario No-Policy (1) Mandate (2) Mandate (3) No-Policy (4) Mandate (5) Mandate (6)
Land allocation (million ha) Crop price ($ Mg–1)
Row crop (a)
Corn 27.5 33.7 (22.6%) 33.4 (−0.9%) 126.0 141.0 (11.9%) 143.6 (1.9%)
• Continuous
corn
13.2 17.2 (30.4%) 17.5 (1.7%) — — —
• Corn in
rotation
14.3 16.5 (15.4%) 15.9 (−3.6%) — — —
Soybeans 33.8 33.3 (−1.6%) 32.7 (−1.8%) 261.48 280.0 (7.1%) 295.7 (5.6%)
Wheat 18.4 18.3 (−0.4%) 18.2 (−0.8%) 170.40 168.4 (−1.2%) 174.0 (3.3%)
Other crops 29.7 30 (1.0%) 29.2 (−2.8%) — — —
Energy crop (b) — — 4.7 — — —




109.4 115.3 (5.3%) 118.2 (2.5%) 335.0 354.8 (6.0%) 366.4 (3.2%)
Idle land 15.1 9.2 (−39%) 6.3 (−31%) — — —
N-fertilizer applied (million Mg)
8.69 9.77 (12.4%) 10.63 (8.8%) — — —
Note: table 1 shows the U.S. land allocation and projected prices of row crops and energy crops by 2030 under the No-Policy, Corn
Ethanol Mandate and Corn+ Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate scenarios. The percentage changes in the parentheses of column (2) and (5)
refer to the changes in the Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario relative to that of the No-Policy scenario. The percentage changes in the
parentheses of column (3) and (6) refer to the changes in the Corn+ Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate scenario relative to that under the
Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario.
to crop production due to corn ethanol and biodiesel
over the 2016–2030 period amounts to a com-
bined 49 ha million−1 l of corn ethanol and biod-
iesel in volumetric terms. This is slightly higher
than the estimate obtained by Chen and Khanna
(2018) which ranged from 12 to 48 ha million−1 l
of corn ethanol. However, their estimate is only
for corn ethanol while ours are for both corn and
biodiesel.
The implementation of Corn + Cellulosic Eth-
anol Mandate will lead to a modest increase in food
prices and land rents of cropland since much of the
production of energy crops will occur on cropland
that would have been idled under the No-Policy scen-
ario. Relative to the Corn Ethanol Mandate, corn
and soybean prices and land rent of cropland will
increase by 2%, 6%, and 3% in 2030, respectively.
The intensive and extensive margin effects on land
use under Corn + Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate dif-
fer from those under Corn Ethanol Mandate. We find
the additional 60 billion l of cellulosic ethanol man-
date will lead to an additional expansion of crop-
land by 3 M ha in 2030 relative to cropland under
the Corn Ethanol Mandate, such that total cropland
will expand by 9 M ha relative to the No-Policy scen-
ario. The land under row crops will decrease slightly
by 1.8 M ha in 2030 (column 3 of table 1). Total
land under corn production remains similar to that
under the Corn Ethanol Mandate; but there is a shift
in corn produced under a corn–soybean rotation to
that produced under a continuous corn rotation due
to incentives for harvesting corn stover. The shift to
continuous corn production lowers the average yield
of corn and increases N application to compensate
for the absence of nitrogen fixation by soybeans and
to compensate for nutrient removal with stover col-
lection (see more details in section 3.4.2.). We find
4.7 M ha land will be converted to energy crops in
2030 under the Corn + Cellulosic Ethanol scenario.
We compare the land allocation in each year after
2016 under No-Policy scenarios and Corn + Cel-
lulosic Ethanol scenario at the CRD level. We find
that, for the 4.7 M ha land converted to energy crops
in 2030 under the Corn + Cellulosic Ethanol scen-
ario, 30% (1.4 M ha) will be from land that was
idle in 2016 in both No-Policy and Corn + Cellu-
losic Ethanol scenario and another 30% (1.4 M ha)
will be from land that becomes idle over the 2016–
2030 period under the No-Policy scenario due to the
growth of productivity, as we noted above. Only the
remaining 40% (1.8 M ha) of land for energy crop
production will require diversion of land that would
have been under food crop production under the No-
Policy scenario in 2030 (figure S1(c)). We find that
the indirect increase in land use (due to conversion
of idle land in 2016) with cellulosic ethanol produc-
tion amounts to 23 ha million−1 l of cellulosic eth-
anol. This is half of the ILUC effect under the Corn
Ethanol Mandate scenario, indicating that the cellu-
losic mandate can be expected to have amuch smaller
ILUC-related GHG intensity compared to the Corn
Ethanol Mandate.
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Fuel consumption (billion l) Consumer fuel prices ($ l–1)
Gasoline 398.8 373.2 324.6 0.64 0.66 0.69
Diesel 202.9 199.5 187.0 0.57 0.59 0.62
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Note: table 2 shows the U.S. fuel consumption and prices 2030 under the No-Policy, Corn Ethanol Mandate and Corn+ Cellulosic
Ethanol Mandate scenarios. The percentage changes in the parentheses of column (3) and (6) refer to the changes in the
Corn+ Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate scenario relative to that of the Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario.
3.3. Effect of alternative biofuels mandate on the
transportation sector
The implementation of the Corn Ethanol blending
Mandate (and biodiesel mandate) will increase bio-
fuel consumption by implicitly subsidizing the bio-
fuel and implicitly taxing the fossil fuel, which create
wedges between their consumer and producer prices
(Chen et al 2014, Holland et al 2015). We find the
Corn Ethanol Mandate will raise the price of blen-
ded fuel ($ per gasoline-equivalent liter) and the price
of VKT ($ km−1) by 2.5%, which will decrease blen-
ded fuel consumption and VKT by 0.5% and 0.9%,
respectively relative to No-Policy scenario (table 2).
The reduction in gasoline consumption will be 11%
larger than the increase in biofuel consumption in
an energy-equivalent base, indicating a liter of bio-
fuel will displace more than an energy equivalent liter
of gasoline in the U.S. (negative domestic rebound
effect).
Our finding on the rebound effect in the ROW
is also significantly different from previous studies
that model U.S. as a major importer of gasoline. For
instance, earlier studies such as Degorter and Drabik
(2011) show that the blend mandate could lead to a
positive rebound effect of 50%–65% (a liter of bio-
fuel displaces less than an energy equivalent liter of
gasoline) in the world gasoline consumption by using
a model that was calibrated to reflect the situation in
U.S. and ROW in 2009. Studies using an earlier ver-
sion of BEPAM, such as Chen et al (2014), show that
the RFS leads to rebound effects of 9% and 54% on
domestic and ROW gasoline consumption in 2030,
respectively. However, the optimal solution from our
model shows that U.S. would continue importing
crude oil in the same quantity as before and will
choose to export the excess gasoline displaced by eth-
anol to the world market rather than reducing the
domestic production and import of oil. This is in
part because the mandates for ethanol are much lar-
ger than for biodiesel and they reduce demand for
gasoline by much more than they reduce demand
for diesel. Given the assumption that gasoline and
diesel are produced in fixed proportions from oil, it
is optimal to continue to produce and import oil to
meet the demand for petroleum diesel and to export
the surplus gasoline. We therefore find that ethanol
production does not affect the world oil market price,
and hence there is no rebound effect on the ROW.
The implicit tax imposed by the 60 billion l cel-
lulosic mandate will lead to an additional increase in
the consumer prices of gasoline and diesel by over 5%,
which will lead to a further reduction in gasoline and
diesel consumption by 49 billion l (13%) and 13 bil-
lion l (1%), respectively, relative to the Corn Ethanol
Mandate. The total VKT ($ km−1) increases by 5.1%,
which will decrease the total blended fuel consump-
tion and total VKT by 2.0% and 1.3%, respectively,
relative to Corn Ethanol Mandate (table 2). We find
the domestic rebound effect will be more negative
under the cellulosic mandate due to the higher cost of
cellulosic biofuels, and the reduction in gasoline and
diesel will be 50% larger than the energy-equivalent
increase in biofuel.
3.4. Effect of the alternative biofuel mandates on
GHG emissions and N-damage
3.4.1. GHG emissions
The cumulative carbon emissions are estimated to
be 31.2 billion Mg CO2-eq with 29.7 billion Mg
CO2-eq (94%) from gasoline and diesel related emis-
sions and 1.6 billion Mg CO2-eq (5%) from agri-
cultural production, respectively, over 2016–2030 in
the No-Policy scenario (table S3). This will decline
by 2.5% with the Corn Ethanol Mandate (including
those due to domestic ILUC) relative to the No-Policy
scenario. We find that the largest decline in emissions
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will be in the transportation sector because of the
biofuel-induced reduction in gasoline consumption
(−1.3 billion Mg CO2-eq) related emissions. Com-
pared to the No-Policy scenario, the life-cycle GHG
emission from the agricultural sector will increase
by 0.28 billion Mg CO2-eq, including 0.2 billion Mg
CO2-eq (71%) from the emissions caused by the
expansion of corn production, and 0.1 billion Mg
CO2-eq (29%) from the domestic ILUC emissions
induced by the Corn Ethanolmandate and increase in
biodiesel production. The total domestic ILUC emis-
sions from the additional corn ethanol and soybean
biodiesel production on a per megajoule (MJ) basis
amount to 9 g CO2-eq MJ−1. This estimate is within
the range of ILUC emissions estimate for corn eth-
anol of 8.7 g CO2-eqMJ−1 and that for soybean biod-
iesel of 18 g CO2-eq MJ−1 (including both domestic
and international ILUC effects) in Taheripour
et al (2017)21.
The implementation of Corn + Cellulosic Eth-
anol Mandate will lead to an additional abatement of
1.25 billionMg CO2-eq (4.1%) over 2016–2030 relat-
ive to the Corn Ethanol scenario. Of the 4.1% reduc-
tion in the cumulative GHG emissions, 3.1% will
occur in the transportation sector and the remaining
1% in the agricultural sector mainly because of the
higher soil carbon sequestration due to the increase
in energy crop production. We find a modest change
in cumulative ILUC-related emissions of 0.01 bil-
lionMgCO2-eq in the case ofCorn+CellulosicMan-
date scenarios over 2016–2030; this implies domestic
ILUC emissions per MJ of 1.5 g CO2-eq MJ−1, which
is only one-fifth of that under the Corn EthanolMan-
date. This is consistent with the findings in the liter-
ature that the cellulosic ethanol mandate will only be
partlymet by energy crops and there will be less diver-
sion of cropland to biofuels (for energy crop produc-
tion) compared to the diversion of cropland to food
crops for biofuel under the Corn Ethanol Mandate
scenario.
3.4.2. N-damage
Table S4 shows the N-fertilizer applied in 2030 under
No-Policy, Corn Ethanol Mandate, and Corn + Cel-
lulosic EthanolMandate scenarios.We find that com-
pared to the No-Policy scenario, the total N-fertilizer
applied to corn by 2030 under the Corn Ethanol
Mandate scenario will increase by 12.4% while the
N-fertilizer applied to other crops will decrease
21Our model examines land use change only in the U.S. There-
fore, this calculation only includes the domestic ILUC-relatedGHG
emissions. If we use estimates from the literature, such as, 8.7 g
CO2-eqMJ−1 for corn ethanol and 20 g CO2-eqMJ−1 for soybean
biodiesel (Taheripour et al 2017), the ILUC-related emissions in
the Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario relative to the No-Policy scen-
ario would increase by 0.005 billion Mg CO2, which would be a
negligible reduction in the GHG emissions savings relative to the
No-Policy scenario reported here.
slightly by 2.7% due to the expansion of corn pro-
duction. The implementation of an additional cel-
lulosic mandate will lead to an additional 0.86 mil-
lion Mg (8.8% increase) N-fertilizer applied, relative
to the Corn Ethanol Mandate. Of the 8.8% increase
in N-fertilizer applied, 5.4% can be attributed to the
additional N-fertilizer applied to compensate for the
soil nutrients removed with the crop residues, 1.4%
is attributed to the additional N-fertilizer applied
on land that shifts to continuous corn from corn–
soybean rotation, while the remaining 2% is applied
for producing energy crops.
3.5. Economic and environmental effects of the
biofuel mandates
We find that the Corn Ethanol Mandate will lead to a
significant decline in the economic net benefits over
2016–2030 (column 2 in table 3). In the transporta-
tion sector, the biofuel mandate will increase gasoline
and diesel prices, lowering fuel consumers’ benefits
by $159 billion (−2%).While the agricultural produ-
cers’ benefits rise by $105 billion (12.5%) due to an
increase in the food prices and planted acreage, these
policies reduce the agricultural consumers’ benefits
by $49 billion ((−)2.3%), relative to the No-Policy
scenario. Overall, imposing the Corn Ethanol Man-
date will lead to a net economic loss of $109 billion
(1% of the total economic net benefits under the No-
Policy scenario). This is in contrast to previous stud-
ies that show the biofuel mandates increase the net
economic benefits (Chen et al 2014, Hudiburg et al
2016). A major reason for this difference is the struc-
tural change in the U.S. fuel market due to which bio-
fuel production in the US does not lower oil imports
and the price of oil but it increases gasoline exports
instead. As a result, the improvement in terms of
trade for the US (defined by the ratio of the price
of exports to imports) is not as large as in previous
studies. Similar to Chen et al (2014) and Hudiburg
et al (2016), we also find biofuel mandates will lead to
net economic benefits in the agriculture sector due to
the mandate-induced increase in commodity prices.
However, we find a substantial economic cost in the
fuel sector since there is no longer a biofuel-induced
reduction in the price of oil imports, as discussed
above in section 3.3.
The implementation of Corn+Cellulosic Biofuel
Mandate will lead to a further reduction in economic
benefits compared to the Corn Ethanol Mandate
only (column 3 of table 3). Although the economic
benefits in the agricultural sector will increase by
$23 billion (0.8%), the benefits in the transportation
sector will decrease by $96 billion (1.3%) over 2016–
2030 relative to Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario. We
estimate the additional economic loss induced by the
Corn+ Cellulosic Mandate will be $69 billion, which
is around 0.6% of the total economic benefits under
the Corn Ethanol Mandate.
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Table 3. Effects of alternative biofuels mandate on social welfare over 2016–2030.
Corn Ethanol Mandate (2) Corn+ Cellulosic Biofuel Mandate (3)
Change relative to Change relative to Corn
No-Policy (1) No-Policy scenario Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario
Quantity Absolute change Absolute change
Scenario ($ billion) ($ billion) % change ($ billion) % change
Agricultural sector 2992 56 1.9% 23 0.8%
Agricultural consumers 2155 −49 −2.3% −5 −0.2%
Agricultural producers 837 105 12.5% 28 3.0%
Transportation fuel sector 7305 −161 −2.2% −96 −1.3%
Crude oil producer 65 −1 −1.7% 0 0.0%
Gasoline consumers 4256 −108 −2.5% −64 −1.6%
Diesel consumers 2984 −51 −1.7% −32 −1.1%
Government revenue 854 −4 −0.5% 4 0.5%
Economic benefits (a) 11 151 −109 −1.0% −69 −0.6%
Social cost of GHG emissions −1561 39 −2.5% 63 −4.1%
Social cost of nitrogen damages −1032 −129 12.5% −42 3.6%
Values of environmental effects (b) −2593 −90 3.5% 20 −0.8%
Total social welfare (a+ b) 8558 −199 −2.3% −49 −0.6%
Note: all values are discounted cumulative numbers over 2016–2030 (discounted rate 3%). The environmental costs of alternative
biofuel policies by discounting the monetary value of cumulative GHG emissions, and the monetary value of cumulative N-damage
costs 2016–2030, as noted in sections 2.1 and 2.2.
The monetized values of GHG emissions and
N-damage are substantial across the three scen-
arios (table 3). We find that there is a trade-off
between higher benefits from GHG emissions sav-
ing and higher value of damages due to N-leakage.
For instance, while the Corn Ethanol Mandate will
lead to savings in GHG emissions by 2.5% valued at
$39 billion over the 2016–2030 period relative to the
No-Policy scenario, it will also increase the N-damage
costs by $129 billion (12.5%). Similarly, Corn+ Cel-
lulosic Biofuel Mandate will increase the savings in
GHG emissions by 4.1% valued at $63 billion but
also lead to additional $42 billion in N-damage costs;
thereby generating an additional $20 billion benefit
relative to Corn Ethanol Mandate scenario (as shown
in table 3).
Overall, we estimate that implementing the
Corn Ethanol Mandate will lead to a net cost of
$199 billion (−2.3%) over 2016–2030 relative to
the No-Policy scenario, while the implementation
of Corn + Cellulosic Biofuel Mandate will impose
an additional economic cost of $49 billion (0.6%)
compared to Corn Ethanol Mandate over the same
period.
3.6. Sensitivity analysis
The future values of several technical and market
parameters in BEPAM are uncertain and can affect
the costs and benefits of biofuel mandates. These
include the export prices of gasoline and diesel, the
demand for US exports of agricultural commodit-
ies, the processing cost of cellulosic biofuel, as well
as key assumptions such as N-fertilizer replacement
rates for crop residues and the values of the social cost
of carbon and N-damage.We examine the robustness
of our key results to alternative assumed values in
BEPAM. First, the economic cost of blending bio-
fuels is expected to be lower if the price of petroleum
products is high. We examine the extent to which
this is the case by simulating a scenario in which the
export prices of gasoline and diesel are 5% higher
than those in the benchmark. Second, an increase in
the demand for US exports for agricultural commod-
ity could substantially increase due to the potential
growing demand for food as incomes in developing
countries increase and diets diversify. Increased pro-
duction of biofuels in this case could lead to a larger
increase in the prices of agricultural commodities and
improvement in US terms of trade; this would lower
the economic costs of biofuels. We examine the sens-
itivity of our results to assumptions about the annual
rate of growth of demand for US exports of agri-
cultural commodities by simulating economic costs
with a substantially higher growth rate (3% instead
of 2% in the benchmark version of BEPAM) of export
demand22.
Third, the economic costs of the cellulosic bio-
fuel mandate for fuel sector will depend on the pro-
cessing cost of producing cellulosic biofuel since it
will affect blended fuel prices for fuel consumers. We
consider a case where improved technology for pro-
ducing cellulosic biofuels lowers the initial produc-
tion cost of cellulosic biofuel by 25% from $0.57 l−1
to $0.43 l−1 and increases the rate of learning-by-
doing over the study period by 25% relative to the
benchmark scenario. Lastly, we analyze the effect of
22 In our benchmark scenarios, the rate of growth of export
demand for major agricultural commodities in the ROW, includ-
ing meat, cereals and oil crops is assumed to be 2%, which is con-
sistent with FAO projections (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012).
More details can be found in table S10 of the SI.
10
Environ. Res. Lett. 16 (2021) 034021 L Chen et al
Table 4. Change in social welfare with Corn Ethanol Mandate relative to No-Policy scenario over 2016–2030 period ($ billion).






























−117 −172 −250 −77 −132 −210
Note: all values are discounted cumulative numbers over 2016–2030 (discount rate 3%). The environmental costs of alternative biofuel
policies by discounting the monetary value of cumulative GHG emissions, and the monetary value of cumulative N-damage costs
2016–2030, as noted in sections 2.1 and 2.2. The low, medium and high social cost of N Damage are $5.45, $10.17, $16.87 Kg−1 N
applied, respectively. More details can be found in table S1 of SI.
the assumption of replacement N-fertilizer applica-
tion with corn stover for the social cost of N-damage
with cellulosic biofuels by simulating a scenario in
which this replacement N application is assumed to
be zero.
Additionally, for each alternative scenario, we also
consider two alternative values for the social cost of
carbon: $50 and $100 and three sets of alternative
social costs of N-damage: low values, median values
and high values, as shown in tables 4 and 5. For the
purpose of comparability, we estimate the change in
total social welfare (including economic costs, costs
of GHG emissions and cost of N-damages) under
the Corn Ethanol Mandate relative to the No-Policy
scenario (table 4) and the change in total social wel-
fare under the Corn + Cellulosic Mandate relative to
Corn Ethanol Mandate (table 5) under each alternat-
ive scenario. We then compare these values to those
under benchmark economic assumptions to estimate
the potential benefit or loss induced by the changes in
these assumptions.
We find that while the social welfare under the
Corn EthanolMandate relative to the No-Policy scen-
ario does change in the expected direction, the dif-
ference between the two remains large and negat-
ive, with social costs ranging from (−)$77 billion to
(−)$284 billion across alternative assumptions and
alternative values of the social cost of carbon and N-
damage. The increase in export prices of petroleum
products and growth rate of export food demand
would increase the benefits of oil producers and
agricultural producers, respectively, since they will
increase the value of our exports and the terms of
trade in favor of the U.S. However, the net change
in social welfare is still negative even at a high social
cost of carbon ($100Mg−1) because of the substantial
welfare loss for the fuel and agricultural consumers
due to the higher commodity prices.
The additional social costs of the Cellulosic Eth-
anol Mandate relative to the Corn Ethanol Man-
date are lower (and benefits are higher) if the cost
of production of cellulosic biofuels is lower or if
no replacement N is applied with corn stover. More
importantly, the Cellulosic Ethanol Mandate leads to
smaller additional costs compared to the Corn Eth-
anol Mandate in all cases and it generally leads to
positive net benefits if the social cost of carbon is high
($100 Mg−1). Overall, the change in total social wel-
fare of Corn + Cellulosic Mandate relative to Corn
Ethanol Mandate will range between (−)$76 billion
and (−)$18 billion with the low social cost of carbon,
and between (−)16 billion and $43 billion with the
high social cost of carbon (table 5).
We also find that there is a trade-off between the
monetized value of the social cost of carbon and N-
damage; a high social cost of N-damage could sub-
stantially decrease total social welfare evenwith a high
social cost of carbon. For instance, when the social
cost of carbon is $100 Mg−1 CO2-eq, total social wel-
fare with the Corn + Cellulosic Mandate relative to
Corn Ethanol Mandate will decrease by 34%–228%,
if the social cost of N-damage is high instead of at the
median level.
4. Discussion
This paper estimates the economic and environ-
mental costs due to the imposition of the Corn
Ethanol and Corn + Cellulosic Ethanol mandate
on the agricultural and transportation sectors in
the U.S. over the 2016–2030 period. We apply a
multi-period, multi-market, partial equilibrium,
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Table 5. Change in social welfare with Corn+ Cellulosic Mandate relative to Corn Ethanol Mandate over 2016–2030 period ($ billion).







































−18 −28 −43 43 32 18
No additional
N is applied for
crop residues
−18 −26 −37 41 33 22
Note: all values are discounted cumulative numbers over 2016–2030 (discount rate 3%). The environmental costs of alternative biofuel
policies by discounting the monetary value of cumulative GHG emissions, and the monetary value of cumulative N-damage costs
2016–2030, as noted in sections 2.1 and 2.2. The low, medium and high social cost of N Damage are $5.45, $10.17, $16.87 Kg−1 N
applied, respectively. More details can be found in table S1 of SI.
open-economy model (BEPAM) of the agricultural
and transportation sectors to endogenously determ-
ine land allocation, food, and fuel, mix of cellu-
losic biofuels, consumption, and prices to meet
the corn ethanol and cellulosic mandates. We also
determine the social costs of GHG emissions and
N-damages associated with the biofuel policies
and add those to the economic costs to determ-
ine the total social costs (or benefits) of biofuel
policies.
One of the concerns with the biofuels is their con-
sequences for food and fuel prices. Our analysis shows
that the mandate increases fuel prices as well as agri-
cultural commodities, mainly corn price, which res-
ults in reducing consumers’ benefits. We find that
the corn ethanol mandate raises corn prices by 12%
and soybeans prices by 7% in 2030 compared to
the No-Policy scenario; the corresponding additional
increase in these prices due to the Cellulosic Ethanol
Mandate are much smaller (2% and 6%, respectively
in 2030). Blended gasoline prices increase with the
mandates are relatively small; by 2% with the Corn
Ethanol Mandate and by 5% with the Cellulosic Eth-
anol Mandate.
While the agricultural producers gain more than
$100 billion over 2016–2030, on the whole the
Corn Ethanol Mandate creates a welfare loss as the
reduction in consumers’ benefits due to increased
food and fuel prices outweigh the increase in crop
producers’ profits. We estimate the economic costs
of the Corn Ethanol Mandate to be $109 billion over
2016–2030. It can also reduce gasoline consumption
by more than 6% and diesel consumption by 2% in
2030 relative to the No-Policy scenario. The bene-
fits due to GHG savings are however far outweighed
by the costs due to additional N-leakage, resulting
in an overall social cost of the Corn Ethanol Man-
date of $199 billion over 2016–2030. These social costs
remain large under alternative assumptions in the
food and fuel sectors and values of social costs of car-
bon and nitrogen.
The implementation of the cellulosic mandate
will also lead to higher agricultural producers’ bene-
fits, although by a smaller amount than Corn Eth-
anol Mandate (by $28 billion). However, it will lead
to larger GHG savings (4.1%), higher GHG bene-
fits ($63 billion) and smaller damages due to N-
leakage ($42 billion) compared to the Corn Ethanol
Mandate. Overall, the additional costs of the Cel-
lulosic Ethanol Mandate are smaller than those of
the Corn Ethanol Mandate. These results are sens-
itive to assumptions of social cost of carbon and
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nitrogen and assumptions about export prices of pet-
roleum products and cellulosic ethanol processing
costs. The Cellulosic EthanolMandate generally leads
to net social benefits when the social cost of carbon
is high.
Our analysis has several policy implications. It
shows the conditions under which cellulosic biofuel
mandate has the potential to provide substantial eco-
nomic and environmental benefits and would, there-
fore, warrant policy support. It also shows the bene-
fits of policy support for research and development
to lower the cost of conversion of biomass to cel-
lulosic ethanol; this could result in social benefits
that range from $9 to $34 billion. Similarly, policies
that limit the application of replacement N with corn
stover removal can reduce the N-damages and lead
to positive net social benefits that range from $8 to
$39 billion.
Our findings should also lead policymakers to
question the effectiveness of technology mandates,
such as the RFS, for promoting cellulosic biofuels. A
key limitation of the RFS is that all cellulosic feed-
stocks that reduce GHG emission intensity below a
60% threshold relative to conventional fuel are treated
as identical. This limits incentives for high yielding
and low carbon energy crops, such as miscanthus and
switchgrass, that have relatively lower carbon intens-
ity and lower N-leakage but are more costly than
corn stover. Performance-based policies, such as the
low carbon fuel standard or supplementing the RFS
with and carbon/N-leakage taxes, or limits on residue
harvest and replacement N application can induce
a shift towards more environmentally friendly cellu-
losic biofuels.
Our analysis relies on a simplifying assumption
that the social cost of N-damage is spatially homo-
genous. However, this estimate of social cost of
N-damage, as Sobota et al (2015) noted, is com-
piled from large-scale studies from diverse regions
(national or regional); this contributes to its geo-
graphical or context similarity which is a core determ-
inant of the validity and reliability or transferring
monetary measures of environmental benefits across
locations. An alternative approach, as some recent
studies suggest, is to use advanced methods, such as
meta-analysis and structural benefit transfer to syn-
thesize site-specific information by estimating a bene-
fit function and predicting the site-specific social cost
of N-damage (Johnston and Thomassin 2010, Kaul
et al 2013, Johnston et al 2018). However, there is
mixed evidence in the literature about whether and
the extent to which these advanced and flexible trans-
fer methods would enhance validity and reliability
compared to the simpler unit value transfer method
used here (Navrud and Ready 2007, Czajkowski et al
2017). We leave it to future research to examine and
compare the social cost of N-damage using differ-
ent approaches. Our approach does provide a first
approximation of the N-damage costs of continuing
the RFS over the 2016–2030 period and enables an
assessment of the trade-offs offered by the different
types of biofuels that it will induce.
Our analysis does not consider the international
ILUC-related emissions since modeling land use in
the ROW is outside the scope of BEPAM. To provide
an outer range of how large these emissions could
be we use estimates from the literature for the total
(domestic and international) ILUC effect and exam-
ine their implications for the GHG savings with each
of the two biofuel mandates. Using the estimates of
8.7 g CO2-eq MJ−1 and 20 g CO2-eq MJ−1 for the
total ILUC effects of corn ethanol and soybean biod-
iesel, respectively, as reported by Taheripour et al
(2017), the overall ILUC-related emission in Corn
Ethanol Mandate scenario relative to the No-Policy
scenario would increase by 0.005 billion Mg CO2
and the total GHG savings in this scenario would be
2.48% instead of 2.5%. We leave it to future research
to provide more accurate assessments of the interna-
tional ILUC-related emissions with the specific bio-
fuel mandates analyzed here. Additionally, this paper
does not examine the effects of biofuel mandate
on other ecosystem services, such as, wildlife biod-
iversity.We leave it to future research to providemore
generalizable evidence of these effects and quantify
their environmental costs.
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